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Do Transatlantic Relations Still Matter?

Transatlantic Relations-Illustration for Chief Executive Magazine © 2005 Tamara Guion

Sim, é longo, mas vale a pena. Excertos da recensão de Sophie Meunier relativa à sessão “Do Transatlantic Relations Still Matter?“, que teve lugar em Montreal na Conferência do Council for European Studies da Universidade de Columbia, em Abril.

“For Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton University, and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, transatlantic relations matter immensely because it is Europe, not China or India, which will be the second global superpower, both in military and civilian terms, for most of the 21st century. This is already true today, though few people, including Europeans, realize it. Excessive pessimism about Europe’s decline stems in part from a tendency to focus on headline-grabbing problems, such as those that often dominate the US-China relationship, rather than stable and incremental cooperation, such as dominates the US-European relationship.

But, more fundamentally, it stems from a basic theoretical misunderstanding by realists, who continue to hold 19th century views about the primacy of “hard” power population, aggregate national income, and military force in great power relations. Many scholars and statesmen would concede that most 21st century global problems can be managed only using “civilian” power, which rests on high per capita income, high technology, international institutions, a robust civil society, close alliances with in!uential actors, and attractive of social and political values. By this measure, Europe is the world’s second superpower. Yet when these same people assess the relative geopolitical standing of nations, they revert to 19th century categories: only big countries with big populations, large aggregate income, a single sovereign state, and massively manned military are treated as superpowers. They fail to understand that active global power projection is increasingly a luxury good available only to those states with high per capita incomes—which is why China and India do so little of it. Even in the military area, Europe, with 21% of the world’s military spending, has 100,000 troops active in global combat situations, compared to China or India, with 4% and 3% of global military spending respectively, and a couple of thousand troops abroad each. Hence, the endless debates about institutionalizing, centralizing and strengthening of European foreign policy as preconditions for the exercise of Euro-power are beside the point: power does not need to be centralized to be usable in the networked world of the 21st century. The transatlantic relationship is more crucial than ever.

One pillar, the US, provides the hard power (and is the “second superpower” on the civilian side) while the other pillar, Europe, specializes in the use of economic in!uence, international law, and power of attraction (while remaining the “second superpower” on the military side). None of this is likely to change for two or three generations.”

Julho 6, 2010 - Posted by | Sem categorias | , ,

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